And while Marie Sandoz may go too far, Custer did have visions of being nominated by acclamation after wiring news of his glorious victory to his political backers at the Democratic Convention in St. Louis.
Custer's complete tactical failure in a situation an experienced company grade officer could have been expected to handle competently is apparent from reading the published histories, but to really get a feel for it you need to walk the land.
6 comments:
When I worked with a bunch of calvary re-enacter's for a BBC movie about Custer and the Little Big Horn, they would hash him and his motives and what he did, night after night and day after day, while we extra's awaited the call to go to work. At one point, one mentioned that at one of our primary war colleges, there is a test put before each candidate. They are given all the circumstances and everything about a battle, and it is the Little Big Horn Campaign, but they are not told this. Over 90% make the same decisions as Custer did, given the info and intel they had at the time.
I think he was arrogant, but he had been in tougher situations before and made them work for him by doing exactly what he did here, I am told. This time they didn't work.
I am no fan of Custer, but just thought you ought to know this.
Hindsight is wonderful. Too bad we can't have foresight and not do things that end badly.
Go back sometime at the anniversary and watch the show the Real Bird clan of Crow's puts on there. Interesting.
One definitely must walk the land to get a proper feel. I had read many accounts of the battle, studied it in tactics class, read maps, etc., but it did come into focus until I stood on Last Stand Hill. That just reinforced my opinion that Custer was an egomanical idiot. As to intel, he knew there was a large village--his scouts told him so. Then, he split his command and approached on the off side of the ridge. Not even a scout on top to keep an eye on the simple savages. Also, he had specific orders, at least as specific as orders were in 1876, to await the arrival of Terry's column. True, he had successfully used bluster and foolhardy charges in prior successes, but, you mess with the bull once too often.....JAGSC
JAGSC, I was amazed when I found out justwhat all went on at Washita, how he put the Indian women and Chgildren n front and followe dhtme out. there were supposedly estimates of 10,000 more scattered on down the river banks, but they didn't want harm to come to the captives.
Every other incident where he attacked the Indians fled and he was surprised that they didn't here. Really surprised. I guess if you kick a wasp nest they will sure get mad!
Jinglebob, your point on hindsight is well-taken. Still, I can imagine neither the Custer haste nor his decision to create and scatter three weak units --(four if you count the train) -- while he was still in the Wolf Mountains where he had no chance to personally observe the LBH plain and where his scouts were warning him that to attack was to die. As Jagsc says, the more you walk the area, the stronger the feeling becomes.
I will cut him appropriate slack for some of the wimpy and vague wording in his orders from Terry. It's reasonable to speculate that Terry was so obsequious because he believed that his lieutenant colonel might well be his commander in chief seven months down the road.
Debating the most debated battle in U.S. (world?) history is fun. I hope we can do it over strong spirits one of these days.
Amen!
I am a newbie to the whole thing, just repeating what I was told by men who hashed and rehashed this out every day for two weeks or more. Interesting at first. Tedious by the time we were done.
Relying entirely on hindsight (what a wonderful thing)---Brash cavalry charges quite often result in disaster; i.e., Balaclava, the Scots Greys at Waterloo, etc. I am not speaking of operations like Stuart's ride around McClellan, or Grierson's trek from Springhill to Baton Rouge. JAGSC
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